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v.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * * *

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1.

Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred on the

Supreme Court by U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(i).

The case under appeal

was a probate action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
2.

The issues presented for review includes
I*

Whether the

brought

spouse's Exempt Property claim

pursuant

"statutory

to

allowance11

U.C.A.
as

§75-2-402

that

term

is

a

is used

in

U.C.A. §75-6-107 such that any deficiency would be
payable from the

multiple-party accounts of the

deceased.
II*

Whether

certain

personal

property,

referred to as the R.C. Willey furniture, which was
purchased

by

the

marriage

to

the

deceased
surviving

shortly

before

spouse,

his

and

in

anticipation of the marriager and which was jointly
possessed

and

used

by

the

deceased

and

his

surviving spouse during the marriage was properly
included and ruled to be solely the property of the
Estate or whether the surviving spouse had some
ownership interest therein either as a Tenant by
the Entireties or as a Tenant in Common.

1

Ill*

If the R.C. Willey Furniture was properly

held to be solely an asset of the Estate, then
whether it should have been valued as of the date
of death and as used property rather than at the
full

cost

of

its

purchase

as

new

property*

Appellant maintaining that the correct value should
have been its value as used furniture at the time
of death and not its full purchase price as new
property ten days previous.
IV*

Whether

certain

other

miscellaneous

personal property of the Estate should have been
valued by the Court at its appraised value, in the
absence of a valid objection thereto, or whether
the

Court,

appraisal

Sua
of

Sponter
the

properly

furniture

ordered

by

a

a new

specific

individual.
V.

Whether

funds

obtained

from

the

multiple-party accounts of the deceased for payment
of

claims

against

the

Estate

should

have been

administered by the Personal Representative as a
part

of

the

§75-6-107,
claimants

Estate

rather
by

the

in

than

accordance
being

other

paid

with

U.C.A.

directly

multiple-party

to

account

holder.
VI.
Personal

Whether payments ordered to be paid to the
Representative

from

the

multiple-party

accounts of the deceased should have included an
award of interest.
2

STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED
The interpretation of the following Statutes is believed
to be determinative of the issues under appeal:
§75-2-402, U.C.A.,(1953) as amended 1975
Exempt Property:
In addition to the homestead allowance, the
surviving spouse of a decedent who was domiciled in
this state is entitled from the estate to value not
exceeding
$3,500 in excess of any security
interests
therein
in
household
furniture,
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal
effects.
If there is no surviving spouse,
children of the decedent are entitled jointly to
the same value.
If encumbered chattels are
selected and if the value in excess of security
interests, plus that of other exempt property, is
less than $3,500, or if there is not $3,500 worth
of exempt property in the estate, the spouse or
children are entitled to other assets of the
estate, if any, to the extent necessary to make up
the $3,500 value. Rights to exempt property and
assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt
property have priority over all claims against the
estate, except reasonable funeral expenses, and the
right to any assets to make up a deficiency of
exempt property shall abate as necessary to permit
prior payment of the reasonable funeral expenses,
homestead allowance, and family allowance. These
rights are in addition to any benefit or share
passing to the surviving spouse or children by the
will of the decedent unless otherwise provided, by
intestate succession, or by way of elective share.
§75-3-706, U.C.A., (1953) as amended 1975
Employment of Appraisers:
The personal
representative may employ a
qualified and disinterested appraiser to assist him
in ascertaining the fair market value as of the
date of the decedent's death of any asset the value
of which may be subject to reasonable doubt.
Different persons may be employed to appraise
different kinds of assets included in the estate.
The names and addresses of any appraiser shall be
indicated on the inventory with the item or items
he appraised.
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§75-6-107, U.C.A. (1953) as amended, 1975
Rights of Creditors:
No multiple-party account will be effective
against an estate of a deceased party to transfer
to a survivor sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and
expenses of administration, including statutory
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children
and dependent children, if other assets of the
estate are insufficient. A surviving party, P.O.D.
payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from a
multiple party account after the death of a
deceased party shall be liable to account to his
personal representative for amounts the decedent
owned beneficially immediately before his death to
the extent necessary to discharge the claims and
charges mentioned above remaining unpaid after
application of decedent's estate. No proceeding to
assert this liability shall be commenced unless the
personal representative has received a written
demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one
acting for a minor or dependent child of the
decedent; and no proceeding shall be commenced
later than two years following the death of the
decedent.
Sums
recovered
by
the personal
representtive shall be administered as part of the
decedent's estate. This section shall not affect
the right of a financial institution to make
payment on multiple-party accounts according to the
terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a
deceased
party
unless
before
payment
the
institution has been served with process in a
proceeding by the personal representative.(1975)

(Editorial Board Comments
Addendum to this Brief.)

are

4

provided

in

the

Rule 706, Utah Rules of Evidence
COURT APPOINTED EXPERTS
(a) Appointment.
The court may on its own
motion or on the motion of any party enter an order
to show cause why expert witnesses should not be
appointed, and may request the parties to submit
nominations•
The court may appoint any expert
witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may
appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An
expert witness shall not be appointed by the court
unless he consents to act. A witness so appointed
shall be informed of his duties by the court in
writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the
clerk, or at a conference in which the parties
shall have opportunity to participate. A witness
so appointed shall advise the parties of his
findings, if any; his deposition may be taken by
any party; and he may be called to testify by the
court or any party.
He shall be subject to
cross-examination by each party, including a party
calling him as a witness.

5

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Personal Representative of her deceased husbands Estate
appeals various rulings of the District Court related to the
Probate of the Estate.
The rulings under appeal were made after a half day trial,
held April 10, 1987 before the Court on the Objections to
Inventory and Accounting filed by the Respondent, Sharon Beers,
a daughter of the decedent.

A transcript of these proceedings

are a part of the record in this appeal and reference thereto
are to page number and line, and in the following form: (TR: pg
xx, In xx).
The court made its findings and rulings from the bench,
which are found verbatim in the transcript at pages 93-102.
These findings and rulings were submitted

to the court as

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order and were signed
by the Court June 22 r 1987. (Pages 172-177 of the Record)

This

is the ruling which is being appealed and a copy is provided in
the Addendum to this brief.
Other issues related to the Probate of this Estate were
resolved

by

Order

of

the same

Court made some

14 months

previous, and after a hearing held February 14, 1986.

None of

the rulings made at that time were appealed, but a transcript
of that proceeding is a part of the record as well as the
Court's Memorandum Decision and the resulting Order on the

6

issues presented at that time. (R 44-47).
Pages 124-148 of the record contain
OBJECTIONS

TO:

DISTRIBUTION

(1)

INVENTORYr

Respondents, "VERIFIED

(2) SUMMARY

OF

ACCOUNT AND

(3) PETITION FOR ALLOWANCE OF CLAIMS AND ORDER

ALLOWING CLAIMS AND (4) MOTION FOR ORDER OF PAYMENT FROM JOINT
ACCOUNT OF THE DECEASED.11

It is referred to in this brief as

simply "Respondents Objections".

The Personal Representative's

"REPLY TO OBJECTIONS", which was incorporated

into counsels

closing argument by reference thereto (TR 93, lines 2 -6) is
also a part of the record (R 152-164) and is referred to in
this brief as "REPLY TO OBJECTIONS".
The issues under

appeal

involve the interpretation of

various provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, especially
U.C.A.

§75-6-107,

as

well

as

questions

of

ownership

and

valuation of certain items of personal property held to be a
part of the estate, and related questions of probate law.
FACTS
The deceased, Allan Hamilton Wagley, married Susan Wagley
on November 25, 1985. (R 173, HI)

Both were of legal age and

no question of the competency of either party has been raised.
On November 20, 1985, five days prior to this, his most
recent

marriage,

the

Decedent

purchased

from

R.C. Willeys

furniture store certain items of household furniture consisting
of a refrigertor, bedroom set, and two chairs at a total cost
of $2,558.00 (R 173, 13). This furniture, which is referred to
as the R.C. Willey furniture, was delivered to his new home

7

after

his marriage

(TR: pg

12, In 1) • The furniture was

purchased in anticipation of marriage (TR: pg 12, In 1) and was
jointly possessed and used by the deceased and his new wife
during their brief marriage. (TR: pg 9, In 1-25; pg 10, In 1;
Pg 57 In 15; Pg 67, In 21-29; Pg 68, In 1-5; Pg 94, In 12-19)
The deceased also brought other miscellaneous personal property
to the marriage. (R 174, 16)
Prior to the marriage, the deceased also established joint
accounts

with

his

daughter,

Sharon

Beers, the

Respondent

herein.

These accounts consisted of approximately $18,000.00,

all

which

of

was

contributed

by

the

deceased

and

which

constituted virtually his entire Estate. (R 173, K2)
On November 30, 1985, five days after his marriage to the
Appellant, the deceased died of a heart attack. (R 173, 11)
The surviving spouse was appointed Personal Representative of
the Estate, and the decedents will was admitted to Supervised
Probate. The

terms

of

the

will

proved

to be

immaterial,

however, because the assets of the Estate were insufficient to
pay

the debts of the deceased, Administrative expenses and

Statutory Allowances to the surviving spouse. (R 175, 116&18)
Because of the insufficiency of the Estate, and pursuant to
D.C.A.

§75-6-107,

the

Court

permitted

invasion

of

the

multiple-party accounts held jointly by the deceased and the
Respondent in order to make up the deficiency necessary to pay
the Court awarded family allowance, the debts of the decedent,
his burial expenses and the costs of administration, (R 176,

8

13).

The court refused to allow the joint accounts to be

invaded

for

the

purpose

of

paying

the

deficiency

in the

surviving spouse's exempt property claim brought pursuant to
U.C.A. §75-2-402.

(R 176, f4)

The surviving spouse claimed ownership of the R.C. Willey
furniture as a surviving joint owner. (R 154) (TR: pg 93f In
2-6)

However,

the court

upheld

the Respondent's

Objection

thereto and ruled that this property was solely an asset of the
Estate and that its fair market value was equal to its purchase
price as new property. (R 173, 13&5)
The Personal Representative claimed no ownership interest
in the other miscellaneous personal property and it was listed
on the original Inventory as Estate property. (R 116-117)

She

obtained an appraisal of this property and no objection to the
appraisal was filed. (TR: pg 99, In 24-25; pg 100, In 1-25; pg
101, In 1), and in fact, the parties below agreed to the value
of the property (R 127, 17).
The court refused to accept the appraisal, however, and
instead, sua sponte, ordered a new appraisal be obtained from a
specific named individual, (R 174, U6) and at the same time,
ruled that the new appraisal would be determinative as to the
fair market value of the property if the Respondent desired to
purchase it, and otherwise, that it was to be sold and valued
at its sales price. (TRt pg 96, In 12-19) (R 174, 16).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I. The District Court ruled that multiple-party accounts of
the deceased were not available to make up the deficiency in
estate assets needed to satisfy the spouse's exempt property
claim.

Appellant maintains this ruling constitutes plain error

based on the clear language of the relevant provisions of the
Utah Uniform Probate Code and the Editorial Board Comments
thereto.
II.

The

District

Court

ruled

that certain

items of

household furniture (referred to as the R.C. Willey Furniture)
purchased by the deceased were solely assets of the estate.
Appellant submits that the evidence shows the property was
acquired in contemplation of marriage and was jointly possessed
and used by the parties during the brief marriage.
the surviving

spouse enjoyed

an ownership

Therefore,

interest

in the

property, either; (1) solely as a surviving joint owner by the
entireties; or (2) as a one-half owner with the estate as a
tennant in common.
III.

The Trial Court set the value of the R.C. Willey

furniture at its full cost of purchase which occurred ten days
before decedent's death.

Appellant maintains that property of

an Estate must be valued as of the date of death.

Appellant

further maintains that in the absense of any other evidence as
to value, the Personal Representatives estimate of value is
conclusive.
IV. With regard to other miscellaneous personal property

10

of the Estate, the Trial Court refused to recognize what was,
in essence, a stipulation between the parties with regard to
value, and for some unstated reason, ordered a new appraisal of
the

property

by

a

specific

named

individual.

Appellant

maintains that this was an abuse of the Courts discretion, and
that the value of the property should have been as set forth by
the first appraisal because that was the only evidence offered
as to value.
V.

The relevant statute allowing the invasion of multiple-

party accounts of the deceased to pay certain basic expenses of
the estate provides that these funds shall be administered as
part of the decedentfs Estate.

The court refused to so order

in this case, thereby complicating the Probate of the Estate
and causing confusion on the part of the creditors with regard
to who was responsible for payment of claims. Appellant argues
that the plain language of the statute requires that sums
recovered from the multiple-party accounts be administered by
the Decedent's Estate*
VI.

Finally, Appellant maintains that amounts ordered to

be paid to the Personal Representative from the multiple-party
accounts of the deceased
interest.

should have included

an award of

This result is dictated by relevant provisions of

the Utah Code which provide for the award of interest at the
legal rate; or, as a matter of equity, under a theory of
quantum meriut, and in order to avoid unjust enrichment of the
other multiple-party account holder.

11

ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE MULTIPLE-PARTY ACCOUNTS OF THE DECEASED SHOULD
BE AVAILABLE TO SATISFY ANY DEFICIENCY IN THE
EXEMPT PROPERTY CLAIM OF THE SPOUSE.

Under the Utah Uniform Probate Codef the surviving spouse
of a decedent is entitled to claim from the estate,

$3,500.00

worth of exempt property in the form of household furniturer
automobiles,

furnishings, appliances

and

personal

effects.

(U.C.A. S75-2-402). If there is not $3,500.00 worth of exempt
property in the estate, the spouse is entitled to other assets
of the Estate to the extent necessary to make up the deficiency
(Id)*

The statute further provides that;

"...Rights to exempt property and assets needed to
make up a deficiency of exempt property have
priority over all claims against the estate, except
reasonable funeral expenses, and the right to any
assets needed to make up a deficiency of exempt
property shall abate as necessary to permit prior
payment
of the
reasonable funeral expenses,
homestead allowance, and family allowance..."
(U.C.A. S75-2-402)
The Utah Uniform Probate Code also provides that;
"No multiple-party account will be effective
against an estate of a deceased party to transfer
to a survivor sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and
expenses of -administration including statutory
allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children
and dependent children, if other assets of the
estate are insufficient-,..11 (U.CA. S75-6-107)
In this casef the District Court ruled that the surviving
spouse may claim exempt property jap to $3,500.00 in property of
the estate but

defined the Estate to exclude the multiple party

12

accounts.

The District Court specifically ruled that proceeds

of the multiple-party account of the decased and his daughter
were not available to satisfy the deficiency in the exempt
property claim of the widow. (R 176, 14)
This is contrary to the plain language of the statute which
specifically includes, "statutory allowances to the surviving
spouse".

(O.C.A. §75-6-107).

For the District Court ruling to

be correct, the term "statutory allowances" must be read to
exclude the surviving spouse's exempt property allowance.
The

Editorial

specifically

Board

states:

"The

Comment
phrase

to

O.C.A.

'statutory

§75-6-107
allowances'

includes the homestead allowance under §75-2-401, the family
allowance under §75-2-403, and any allowance needed to make up
the deficiency in exempt property under §75-2-402." (emphasis
added). (See Addendum for full Text)^ Likewise, the Official
Comments to the Model Uniform Probate Code also define the
phrase "statutory allowances" to include any allowance needed
to make up the deficiency in exempt property under Section
2-402.

(Model

Uniform

Probate

Code

6-107)(See Addendum for full text).

-

Comment,

Section

Therefore, it would seem

that the District Courts ruling on this point constitutes plain
error.
While no cases have been found construing U.C.A. §75-6-107,
that is not surprising in view of the clear language of the
statute and the availability of the Official Comments to define
"statutory allowances".

Certainly there are no cases or other

13

indication that the legislature intended any result other than
that provided in the Official Comment and the plain language of
the statute.
The importance of this statute is especially apparent in
this case.
under

There is nothing for the omitted spouse to claim

U.C.A.

S75-2-301.

Similarly,

peculiarities of the Utah Law#

because

the augmented Estate

of

the

(U.C.A.

§75-2-202) offers absolutely no protection to this surviving
spouse.

(See, 1976 Utah Law Review 771 at 807-812)

POINT II
THE SURVIVING SPOUSE HAD AN OWNERSHIP INTEREST IN
THE HOUSEHOLD GOODS AND FURNISHINGS REFERRED TO AS
THE R.C. WILLEY FURNITURE, EITHER AS A TENANT BY
THE ENTIRETIES OR AS A TENANT IN COMMON.
The R.C. Willey furniture was purchased by the deceased in
anticipation of marriage and for the use of both parties to the
marriage. (TR: pg 94f In 12-19). And it was jointly possessed
by them during their brief marriage. (TR: pg 11, In 25; pg 12,
In 1)

The surviving spouse claimed an ownership interest in

the R.C. Willey furniture as a surviving joint owner. (R 154)
(TR: pg

93, In 2-7). Alternative

forms of ownership would

include: (1) Sole ownership as the surviving owner as a Tenant
by the Entireties, or; (2) One-half owner with the Estate as a
Tenant in Common.
The District Court, however, while recognizing

that the

R*C. Willey furniture was part of the marital estate, (TR: pg

14

94, In 12-19), nonetheless refused to recognize an ownership
interest in the spouse and instead ruled that the property was
solely an asset of the estate

(R 173, 15)

(TR: pg 94, In

12-19).
The law regarding ownership of personal property in the
joint possession of husband and wife is, to say the least,
unsettled. See, Townsend,

Creation of Joint Rights between

Husband and Wife in Personal Property: Part I, 52 Mich Law Rev.
779

(1954); and Townsend,

Creation of Joint Rights between

Husband and Wife in Personal Property: Part II, 52 Mich Law
Rev. 957 (1954).

Not surprisingly, the thrust of Professor

Townsend's article involves the question of whether the joint
ownership of personal property between husband and wife is by
Tenants in the Entirety or as Tenants in Common, which seems to
assume joint rather than sole ownership.

While the scope of

Professor Townsend1s article is quite broad, the issue in. the
case at hand is far less complex because it involves only the
question

of

the ownership

interest

in household

goods and

furnishings acquired in contemplation of, or after marriage,
and for use by the family*
Most of the courts

that have considered

this specific

question, at least in modern times, have resolved the question
clearly in favor of joint ownership.

For the most part, this

has been accomplished through application of the doctrine of
ownership by the entirety.
Haskins, 714 P*2d 354

(See, e.g. Faulk v. Estate of

(Alaska, 1986); DuPont v. DuPont, 33
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Del.Ch 571, 98 A.2d 493, (1953); Hagin v. Haqin, 353 So.2d 949
(Pla.App.1978); Bender v. Bender, 282 Md. 525, 386 A.2d 772
(1978); DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174
(1975).

(See also, 64 ALR2d 8 §28, and later case service for

cases cited therein).
Courts that have rejected the doctrine of tenancy by the
entireties with regard to household goods and furnishings,
either because of statute or otherwise, have generally held
that

joint ownership by husband

property

is

ordinarly

as

and wife of such personal

Tenants

in Common.

(Panushka

v.

Panushka, 349 P.2d 450, 221 Or. 145 (1960), and cases cited;
Remington v. Landolt, 541 P.2d 472, 273 Or. 297.(1975).
Whether tenancy by the entirety in personal property is a
viable principle of Utah Law, seems to be an open question.
Professor Townsend expresses the opinion that while no longer
applicable to an interest in real estate, the Utah legislature
has

inferred that it still exists with respect to

personal property. (52 Mich. Law Rev. note 76 at 797).
unclear

whether

Professor

Townsend

is

relying

on

It is
the

legislative intent expressed in U.C.A. §57-1-5, or otherwise.
It

is clear, however, that the concept of tenancy by the

entirety is at least noted in U.C.A. §78-41-1.
The

cases

collected

by

Professor

Townsend

that

have

resolved the issue of tenancy by the entirety as related to
personal property, do little to clarify the question. (52 Mich
Law Rev. note 79 at 797)
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In the recent cause of Gorrell v. Gorrellf 62 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30 (Ct. App. 1987) (semble) The Utah Court of Appeals had
occasion to consider the ownership of a cash asset as between a
decedent and her surviving spouse.

In that case, the trial

Court ruled that a cash asset found in the house, the existance
which had been previously unknown to the surviving spouse, was
solely an asset of the deceased wife's Estate.

The Court of

Appeals reversed and held that it was error to impose on the
surviving spouse the burden of proving ownership.
It seems clear that the Court of Appeals found the asset in
Gorrell to be the sole property of the surviving spouse rather
than belonging equally to the surviving spouse and the estate
of the deceased as Tenants in Common.

It is unclear, however,

whether the Court reached this result because it believed the
hidden asset belonged solely to the surviving spouse before the
death of his wife, or whether it became his sole property upon
her death by the doctrine of Tenancy by the Entirites or some
other unstated legal theory.
Unlike the case under appeal here, in Gorrell the parties
had been married

for over 22 years.

statute

cases

nor

any

that

purport

However, there is no
to determine

property

ownership between a decedent and a surviving spouse based on
the length of their marriage.

On final analysis, the decision

in Gorrell seems to support appellant's arguement in this case,
but it does not seem to provide applicable reasoning.
In 1986, the Alaska Supreme Court had occasion to consider
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the question of the ownership interest of a surviving spouse in
personal property which had been jointly used and possessed by
the spouse and the decedant.
P.2d 354 (Alaska 1986).

Faulk v. Estate of Haskins, 714

In Faulk, the facts of which are very

similar to the case at barf the Alaska Court concluded quite
simply that household goods and furnishings which a husband and
wife jointly possess and use is presumed to be held in tenancy
by the entirety.
While the Alaska Supreme Court had the benefit of a statute
which seemed to affirm the existance of tenancy by the entirety
in Alaska, at least with respect to personal property, (AS
34.15.130) they specifically relied upon the reasoning for the
presumption as set forth by the Delaware Chancelors Court in
DuPont v. DuPont, 98 A.2d 493, 33 Del. Ch. 571 (1953). In the
DuPont

case, a particularly well written and well reasoned

decision, the court stated:
"I conclude that household goods and furnishings,
even though contributed or paid for by the husband,
are
presumptively
held
jointly-by
the
entireties-when such property is in the joint
possession and use...I reach this conclusion for
several
reasons.
First,
under
present
day
conditions, there is no longer any compelling
reason to conclude that property so intimately
associated with the marriage relationship should be
considered as presumptively belonging to eitherone. Each spouse in his or her own way contributes
to the accumulation of such property...11
*If married couples desire to preserve individual
title to such property, it is up to them to
evidence such ownership by appropriate documents or
by
other
evidence
which
can
overturn
the
presumption of joint ownership.
I believe the
presumption that they hold such property by the
entirety is not only fair under the circumstances
but almost legally necessary to avoid an accounting
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in every such case. Moreover, the difficulties of
tracing title over a period of time would render
the problem almost legally insurmountable. I point
out that my decision is confined to the question of
title as between husband and wife to houshold goods
and furnishings held and used as here stated."
Similiar reasoning led the Pennsylvania Superior Court

to

conclude that a truck held in the husbands name alone was
entireties1 property where the truck had been used for the
benefit of the marriagef with access to use equally permitted
wife and husband, despite the fact that another truck which had
been traded to purchase the truck in question had been titled
in the husbands name alone.

Simon v. Simon, 429 A.2d 1, 286

Pa. Super 403 (1981)
Likewise, most courts that have considered the issue have
concluded

that

the mere

fact that the funds used for the

purchase belonged to one or the other of the spouses does not
result in the furnishings in question being owned solely by
that spouse.

This principal was expressed most clearly by the

Maryland Supreme Court in Bender v. Bender, 386 A.2d 772, 282
Md 525 (1978), which responded to the question as follows:
"We today conclude that in the case of household
goods and furnishings acquired for the use of the
family in contemplation of or after marriage, the
mere fact that the funds used for the purchase
belonged to one or the other of the spouses does
not result in the furnishing in question being
owned solely by that spouse. It is to be presumed
in such a case that the purchasing spouse made a
gift of the property to the marital unit, creating
ownership by the entireties in the husband and
wife..." (Id at 778-779)
In

its

decision,

the

Bender

Court

relied

upon

the

reasoning set forth by the Pennsylvania Court in the landmark
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case of DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 331 A.2d 174, 459 Pa. 641.

In

that case, the household goods and furnishings were admittedly
purchased with decedents funds.
selected

Nevertheless, both spouses

the various items together, intended the items be

mutually used, and in fact, shared in such item's use and
possession.
both

Based on the foregoing, the trial court found that

parties

furnishings

intended

to

the

to

donate

"marital

the

unit"

household

and

concluded

goods

and

that

the

household items belonged to both parties, but, as tenants in
common.
The

Id at 17815].
DiFlorido

trial

court,

in

order

to

ascertain

the

ownership of these household items, traced the source of funds
used in purchasing the contested property and then, presuming
the purchaser to be the owner, placed the burden on the other
party to show that a gift to the marital unit had been made.
(Id at 178 T5]K
The

appeals

court

rejected

that

reasoning

as follows:

*...[W]e cannot accept an approach that would base ownership of
household items on proof of funding alone, since to do so would
necessitate

an

itemized

accounting

whenever

a dispute over

household goods arose..."
The DeFlorido Court then held:
"We conclude, therefore, that for the purpose of
determining
title
of
household
goods
and
furnishings between husband and wife, the property
that has been acquired in anticipation of or during
marriage, and which has been possessed and used by
both spouses, will, in the absence of evidence
showing otherwise, be presumed to be held jointly
by the entirety." (Id at 180)(emphasis added)
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The opposite

result was reached

Anselmi, 52 B.R. 479

in the case of In re:

(Bkrtcy 1985).

In this fascinating

decision, the Bankruptcy Court was called upon to interpret
Wyoming Law with regard to the ownership of household goods and
furnishings in the possesion of married persons.

The court

concluded

of

that

Wyoming

was

among

the

minority

states

recognizing tenancy by the entirety in personal property.

The

Court then entered into a detailed and technically appealing
analysis of the requirements of tenancy by the entirety under
the common

law

as

interpreted

by

the Wyoming

Courts. (Id

485-487)
Based on this anaylsis, the Anselmi Court characterized
household goods and artwork possessed by the debtor and his
wife,

(wherein the debtor

claimed an exemption as entirety

property), as "personalty without instruments of title". (Id,
491), and concluded that the personal property in question was
not of the kind or nature usually capable of being held by the
entirety, because the property right to such property was not,
in some manner, embodied in a document, (Id, 492) and hence,
that

one

of the

"unities"

required

for a tenancy by the

entireties, that of unity of interest, was missing.

Since the

property was not of the nature that could be held in tenancy by
the entirety, the court concluded that household goods and
furnishings, jointly possessed and used by married persons in
Wyoming, are held by the spouses as Tenants in Common.
Of interest is the fact that even though denying Entireties

21

ownership, the Anselmi Court recognized that the spouse was at
least

a

tenant

household goods.

in

common

of

jointly

used

and

possessed

Indeedr it seems impossible to conclude that

a woman would not have some ownership interest in the bed
shared with her husband, even though it may have been for only
a brief time.

POINT III
IP THE PERSONAL PROPERTY REFERRED TO AS THE R.C.
WILLEY FURNITURE WAS PROPERLY INCLUDED IN THE
ESTATE, THEN IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN VALUED AS OF THE
DATE OF DEATH, AND AS USED PROPERTY RATHER THAN AT
THE FULL COST OF ITS PURCHASE AS NEW PROPERTY.
The trial Court set the value of the R.C. Willey furniture
(which

consisted

of

a bedroom

setf

refrigerator, and

two

chairs) at $2,558.00 and held them to be a part of the probate
estate.

(R 173f

15). The District Court further found that

these items were purchased on November 20, 1985, some ten days
before the decedents death, for a cost of $2,558.00. (R 173,
13)
It is axiomatic that for probate purposes, the property of
an estate is valued as of the date of death.

There is no

evidence that this property could have been returned to the
seller for full credit of purchase price, and in fact, the
surviving spouse testified that the property was used furniture
and that R.C. Willeys would not have taken it back. (TR: pg 68,
In 13-16)*
decedents

Even though purchased only 10 days prior to the
death,

and

delivered
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only

a

few

day

prior

to

decedents

death,

the

testimony

is

uncontroverted

that

the

property was used furniture at the time of decedents death.
Clearly, it was error for the court to value it at its full
cost of purchase as new property.
O.C.A.

§75-3-705,

provides

that

the

inventory

of

"... [Plroperty owned by the decedent at the time of his death
be listed with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each
listed item its fair market value as of the date of decedents
death,..."
further

(emphasis

provides

added)

that

Likewise,

for

O.C.A.

supplementary

§75-3-707,

inventory

or

appraisement, the property be listed "... [Slhowing the market
value as of the date of the decedents death...", (emphasis
added)
Appellant maintains that the District Court

incorrectly

characterized the property in question as new, when it was in
fact used, and incorrectly set the value of the property at its
full cost of purchase ten days prior to the decedents death.
Appellant further maintains that the value of the property
should

be

established

as

set

forth

in

the

Personal

Representatives Reply to Objection to inventory which was filed
with the court and which is a part of the record of this
appeal, wherein the Personal Representative estimated the fair
market value of the refrigerator and two chairs to be no more
than $400.00 and the value of the bedroom furniture as used
property to be no more than $300.00. (R 154).

In the absence

of an appraisal, which the Respondent and objecting party had
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every opportunity to obtain. Appellant maintains that the fair
market value estimated by the owner of the property and by the
Personal Representative who was in possession of the property
is

conclusive

as

to

value.

Seattle-First

Nat.

Bank

v.

Marshall, 557 P.2d 352, 16 Wash. App. 503.
In the alternative, Appellant requests that the issue of
valuation of the furniture as used property be remanded for
hearing.

POINT IV
THE VALUE OF OTHER MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAL PROPERTY
OF THE ESTATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET AT ITS APPRAISED
VALUE.
The Inventory filed by the Personal Representative in this
matter included 23 items of miscellaneous used furniture which
had been owned by decedent for some time and in which the
surviving spouse claimed no ownership interest. (R 116-117).
The

Personal

appraised

by

Representative

caused

to

the

a

furniture

owner

of

used

have

the

property

company

who

appraised each item separately at a total value of $85.35. The
name

and

inventory
S75-3-706.

address
with
A

of

the
copy

the

appraisor

was

items

appraised

as

of the

indicated
required

by

appraisal was attached

on

the

U.C.A.
to the

Inventory as Exhibit A. (R 119-120)
The Respondent
Objections

to

the

daughter

of the decedent filed Verified

Inventoryr

but

did

appraisal of this property. (R 124-126)
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not

object

to

the

The Respondent did not

object

to

the value placed

on the

inventory, but

instead

objected to the claim filed by the Personal Representative for
payment of storage expenses on this property. In fact, the
Respondent acknowledged the value of the property
to

be

equal

to

$85.35,

(R

127,

17)

the

in question

amount

of

the

appraisal.) Respondents Objection was not to the value of the
property, but to the payment of storage costs which nearly
equalled the value of the property.
The

Respondent

testified

at

the

hearing

that

she had

previously objected to the value placed on the property. (TR:
pg. 31 In. 19-21) However, the question she was answering was
obviously misleading and confusing.

(TR: pg 31-33)

In her

Verified Objections, she did not object to the value placed on
the property, but in fact, acquiesced
forth in the Inventory. (R 127, 17)

in the valuation set

She further testified that

she did not obtain an independent appraisal of the property.
(TR: pg 31, In 25).
Her objection was to the storage costs, not the valuation
of the property.

She did not object to valuation, and in fact,

stipulated to the appraised value (TR: pg 33, In 4-8) (R 127,
17).
Appellant submits that Respondent cannot have it both ways.

Note however that in the Personal Representatives Reply to
Objection it was pointed out that this property was stored at
the request of Respondent who had indicated a desire to claim
it and that the Personal Representative had actually suggested
in writing that Sharon Beers take possession of this property
in order to avoid the storage cost of approximately $30.00 per
month. (R 159-160)
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She cannot object to the Estate storage costs on the grounds
that it is disproportionate to the value of the property, make
no objection at that time to the valuation of the property,
make no effort to obtain an independent appraisal, and then be
deemed to have made a valid objection to the valuation itself.
In fact, Respondent did not intend to object to the value, but
the District Court merely misconstrued her objection.
The Court, in its ruling and on its own Motion, ordered
that the property be appraised by a specific individual from a
specific company in Ogden, Utah. (TR: pg 96; R: pg 3, 16) The
District Court was reminded that an appraisal had been done and
that there was no objection to that appraisal. (TR: pg 99, In
24; pg

100, In 25) Still, the District Court, sua sponte,

ordered that the property be appraised a second time, and by a
specific named individual.
Appellant maintains that this ruling contradicts the spirit
and purpose of the Utah Uniform Probate Code as set forth in
U.C.A. §75-3-705 and -706, and constitutes an abuse of the
Courtfs discretion.
reads as follows:

The Editorial Board Comment to §75-3-705
(Full text provided at Addendum A-7).

"This and the following sections eliminate the
practice now required by many probate statutes
under which the judge is involved in the selection
of appraisers.
If the Personal Representative
breaches his duty concerning the inventory, he may
be removed. §75-3-611...The alternative procedure
is to file the inventory with the court ...The
court's role in respect to the second alternative
is simply to receive and file the inventory with
the file relating to the estate."
A * new appraisal was obtained from the specific individual
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designated by the court.

The new appraisal was $135.00. (R

184).
The Court did not explainf and gave no indication of the
need for this second appraisal.

Was the objection directed

toward the individual who performed the first appraisal? If so,
is there a list of appraisers who are not acceptable to Court?
If this is the case, due process would seem to require that
this list be made public so that personal representatives do
not waste their time and the funds of the estate in obtaining
appraisals from persons who are not acceptable to the Court.
If, on the other hand, only certain appraisers, or if only
one appraisor is qualified to so act before the Court, then
again, fundamental due process and common sense would seem to
require that this fact be stated in the Rules of Practice of
the Court so that all parties may be informed thereof.
In the absence of an assertion of bad faith, Appellant
maintains that it was a clear abuse of discretion for the
District Court to order a new appraisal from a specific named
individual in the face of an apparently valid appraisal, no
genuine

objection

thereto, and acquiescence therein by all

interested parties. Walters v. Schmeer, 422 P.2d 676, 245 Or.
477 (1967).
Appellant recognizes that the District Court has discretion
to appoint expert witnesses of its own selection and on its own
motion. (Rule 706(a) O.R.E.)

However, the plain language of

this Rule requires the court, whether acting on its own motion
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or on the motion of any party, to enter an Order to Show Cause
why expert witnesses should not be appointed*

The Rule further

allows either party to show cause why expert witnesses should
not

be

appointed.

Clearly

this

is an instance where no

additional expert testimony could be justified.
Additionally,

Rule

706(a)

U.R.E.

provides

for

the

deposition of any expert witness named pursuant to the Rule and
specifically

provides

that

he

cross-examination by each party.
support

shall

be

subject

to

Rule 706(a) U.R.E. will not

the District Court's Ruling in this case which, in

effect, set the value of the property at the amount determined
by this specific appraiser in the absence of any opportunity to
cross-examine,
procedural

to present other evidence, or even the minimum

opportunity

to object

to the need

therefore

as

specifically required by the Rule.
Clearly, the Courts ruling in this regard constitutes plain
error, and is an abuse of the Courts discretion.

POINT V
FUNDS OBTAINED FROM THE MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNTS OF
THE DECEASED FOR PAYMENT OF CLAIMS AGAINST THE
ESTATE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED BY THE
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE AS A PART OF THE ESTATE.
U#C.A# §75-6-107 specifically provides that "Sums recovered by
the Personal Representative

[from multiple-party accounts of

the deceased] shall be administered as part of the Decedents
Estate."

In this case, only the family allowance was paid over

28

to the Personal Representative to be administered as part of
the Estate.

Despite demands and requests by the Personal

Representative for payment of funds to pay funeral expenses of
the deceased and costs of his last illness, as well as other
expenses of the Estate, no payments other than the family
allowances mentioned above were paid over*

Application was

made to the court in the form of an Order to Show Cause, (R
75-79), but the court refused to rule on the issue, and instead
directed that the entire matter be set for trial of all issues.
(R 84-86).
Appellant does not claim that either the Estate or the
Personal Representative suffered any monitary loss as a result
of the funds not being administered as part of the Estate.
Instead

the

provisions
Probate

failure
of

and

the
had

Representatives

of the Court
statute

the
credit

creditors of the Estate.
For

in this

potential
and

to enforce
regard

of

relevant

complicated

damaging

reputation

the

the

with

the

the

Personal
various

(TR: pg 92, In 19-25) (R 156-158)

example, several claims contained

notations to the

Respondent, Sharon Beers, and her phone number, but did not
contain either the Personal Representatives name and number or
that of her attorney. (R 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144)
the

case

employee

even

though

contact

the

the

attorney

claimants

This is

for the Estate had an
on

numerous

occasions.

(Testimony of Brandon Nelson, TR: pg 77, In 8-16) (R 157-158)
At the time of the final hearing on this matter, April 10,
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1987, some 17 months after decedent's death, the fune*ral
expenses and some of the medical expenses of the deceased had
still

not

been

paid.

(R

174,

18)

while

the

Personal

Representative and surviving spouse was carried as the creditor
on most of these statements, thereby potentially damaging her
credit. (Plaintiffs Exhibit E)
In addition, there was considerable confusion as to who was
responsible for the bills and even as to the amount of the
bills. (Compare-TR: pg 26 & 27; with TR: pg 62, In 21-25 & pg
63

In

1-18).

Appellant

submits

that

this

confusion

was

primarily the result of the creditors now knowing with whom
they

were

dealing

156-158)

or who was

Appellant

further

responsible
submits

for payment.

that

the

(R

Personal

Representative always had the responsibility to pay these bills
and that the creditors were entitled to look to the Personal
Representative

for

satisfaction

of

their

claims

(U.C.A.

§75-3-701, et seq.), irrespective of the fact that the funds to
pay these claims might or would come from the multiple-party
accounts of the deceased and the Respondent. (D.C.A. §75-6-107)
If

this

Court

orders

additional

payments

from

the

multiple-party accounts of the deceased as a result of this
appeal, in the interest of future Personal Representatives who
may be faced with this dilemma, Appellant urges this Court to
rule that U.C.A. §75-6-107 means exactly what it says, that,
"Sums

recovered

by

the

Personal

Representative

[from

the

multiple-party accounts of the deceased] shall be administered
by the decedents estate11.
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POINT VI
AMOUNTS ORDERED TO BE PAID TO THE PERSONAL
REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE MULTIPLE PARTY ACCOUNTS OF
THE DECEASED SHOULD HAVE INCLUDED AN AWARD OF
INTEREST.
The final payments to the personal Representative from the
multiple-party accounts of the deceased were made June 5, 1987,
some 18 months after decedents death.

The sums on deposit in

the multiple party accounts were presumably earning interest
during this time inasmuch as the Court had ruled they not be
withdrawn except to pay family allowance and debts of the
estate. (R 73).
It is unjust for the Respondent to profit by sums left on
deposit during the pendency of these proceedings.

Equity seems

to require that payments eventually made from these accounts
include an award of interest equal to the interest being earned
on the money.
Interest is generally allowed for claims against an estate,
and generally at the legal rate.
also

Comments

to

Model

Probate

U.C.A. §75-3-806(4). (See
Code

§3-806(d) • A In

this

instance, however, interest equal to whatever the funds earned
while on deposit seems more just and equitable and further
removes

the

question

of

fault

or

blame

for

the delay.

Essentially, this is a claim for interest on a theory of
quantum meriut.
General support for this approach is found in the case of
In re: Listman's Estate, 57 Utah 471, 197 Pac 596 wherein the
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court held that, "...Illnterest was not chargeable as a matter
of course against an executor, but may be so charged if the
circumstances of the particular case require it."

In that

case, an executor failed to invest in bonds as directed by the
court and was held chargeable with interest lost as a result of
this failure to invest.

The award was not meant as a penalty

so much as a requirement to do equity in the circumstances of
that case*
Appellant's

request

for

an

award

intended to be punitive in any way.
merely an attempt to do equity.

of

interest

is

Nor would it be so.

not
It is

Otherwise, the Respondent will

have been unjustly enriched in the form of interest earned on
money actually belonging to other parties during the pendency
of these proceedings.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant requests the following Rulings of this Court.

I

That the spouse's exempt property claim is a "statutory

allowance" as that term is used in U*C.A. §75-6-107, and that
the multiple party accounts of the deceased are available to
satisfy any deficiency in exempt property claimed pursuant to
S75-2-402.

II

That the personal property referred to as the R*C. Willey

furniture

was held jointly by the decedent and the surviving

spouse, either as Tenants in the Entirity, which would make the
surviving

spouse

the

sole

owner

free

of

Probate;

or,

alternatively, that the surviving spouse was a Tenant in Common
with respect to the property and that after Decedents death,
she was a one-half owner of the property, jointly with, the
Estate*

III

If the R.C* Willey furniture is held to be a part of the

Estate, that it should have been valued as of the date of death
and as used property

rather than at the full cost of its

purchase as new property*

IV

That the District Court abused its discretion in ordering a

new appraisal of personal property of the Estate referred to as
the "other miscellaneous property", and that the value of the
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property is as set forth in the first appraisal submitted with
the Inventory.

V.

That sums which were recovered from the multiple-party

accounts of the Deceased pursuant to U.C.A. §75-6-107 should
have been administered as part of the Decedent's Estate, and
not paid directly to claimants by the other multiple-party
account holder*

VI.

That

payments

ordered

to be paid

to the Personal

Representative from the multiple-party accounts of the deceased
should have included an award of interest under a theory of
Quantum Meriut* and that the case be remanded for determination
of the appropriate award of interest.
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Michael L. Deamer, #844
UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER
Attorneys for Sharon Beers
Suite 520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-0441

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the matter of the

:

Estate of:

:

ALLAN HAMILTON WAGLEY,

FINDINGS OF FACT
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

:
P r o b a t e N o . 3364

Deceased.
The P e t i t i o n
Allowance

of

:

of t h e p e r s o n a l

Claims,

Approval

Distribution,

Inventory,

Joint

of D e c e d e n t

Accounts

Beers

came

pursuant
before

in
on

before

of

S.
Utah,

the

and t h e C o u r t

the

having

Page,

Account

Objections

for
and
from

of

Sharon

above-entitled

Court

April

District

and 'Daniel

L.

at

Wilson,

on b e h a l f

testimony

10, 1987,

Judge,

representative

Esq. a p p e a r i n g

received

decedent

of Payment

on F r i d a y ,

personal

a n d M i c h a e l L. D e a m e r ,

of

for Order

of t h e p a r t i e s
Rodney

of

Summary

and t h e V e r i f i e d

Farmington,
behalf

of

and Motion

hearing

the Honorable

appearing

Beers,

for

to Stipulation

courthouse

estate,

on

representative

Esq.

and
of

the

the

Sharon

and e v i d e n c e

and

being

fully advised

in the premises, now therefore, hereby

enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
!•

The decedent Allan Hamilton Wagley and the personal

representative Susan Wagley were married on November 25, 1985,
and decedent died on November 30, 1985.
2.

Prior

to

decedent's

marriage

to

the

personal

representative, decedent established two joint accounts, one at
Valley Bank and one at Davis County Bank in the sum of $8,000 and
$10,000 respectively in January of 1985, with the name of Mrs.
Sharon Beers, decedent's daughter, being added to those accounts
in April of 1985.

Decedent indicated at that time that it was

his desire that Mrs. Sharon Beers receive those funds upon his
death that were placed in joint tenancy.
3.

Prior to decedent's marriage to the personal representa-

tive, furniture and fixtures were purchased from RC Willey on
November 20, 1985 f consisting of chairs, a refrigerator, a bedroom set, etc.,
4*

Prior

for a cost of $2,558.
to

decedent's

marriage

to

the

personal

representative, decedent made a gift of a Wurlitzer organ to his
grandson, Ronald Beers, and delivered said organ to his daughter
Sharon Beers and as such the organ is not part of the probate
estate*
5.

The furniture and fixtures referred to in Paragraph 3

above have a value of $2,558 and are part of the probate estate.
2

A-2-

6.

Certain miscellaneous furniture

and f i x t u r e s owned by

d e c e d e n t p r i o r t o t h e m a r r i a g e a r e p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e and
i t w o u l d b e i n t h e b e s t i n t e r e s t of t h e e s t a t e t h a t s a i d p r o p e r t y
b e a p p r a i s e d by H i l l s F u r n i t u r e i n Ogden and s o l d t o g e t h e r
the fish

with

tank.

I.

The $250 S o c i a l S e c u r i t y d e a t h b e n e f i t

and t h e f i s h

h a v i n g a v a l u e of a p p r o x i m a t e l y $150 a r e a s s e t s of t h e

tank

probate

estate.
8.

The u n p a i d c l a i m s a g a i n s t t h e e s t a t e a r e $10 t o T a n n e r ' s

Clinic,

$13.40 t o M e r c h a n t ' s C r e d i t ,

and

additional

an

Mortuary,
paid

by

claim

of

$18 t o t h e s h e r i f f ' s

$452,04

to

Linguist

and

i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e $1,911.05 which had been
Sharon

Beers

and

the

$1,200

previously

office,
Son's

previously

paid

by

the

t h e e s t a t e a r e $542

for

estate.
9.

Additional

valid claims against

o p e n i n g and c l o s i n g t h e g r a v e p a i d
Mrs.

Sharon Beers

account.

as w e l l

as t h e

from t h e p e r s o n a l
sum of

$50 p a i d on t h e

T h e r e i s a l s o a v a l i d c l a i m f o r $136 f l o w e r

p a i d by t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e and $78 i n s t o r a g e
10.
for

family
II.

funds

There is a valid claim against the e s t a t e

of

Visa

expenses
expenses.

for

$1,800

allowance.
P o r t i o n s of t h e m i s c e l l a n e o u s

furniture

and

fixtures

a f t e r a p p r a i s a l by H i l l s F u r n i t u r e of Ogden may b e p u r c h a s e d by

3
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Mrs.

Sharon

Beers

at the appraised

price if Mrs. Beers so

desires.
12.

The funds existing in the joint accounts are not part

of the estate property for the purpose of the exempt property
claim of the widow.

Said funds should not be considered to

augment the estate under the statute.
13.

To the extent there is property with value in the

estate, the widow is entitled to a claim of exempt property up to
$3,500.
14.

There is an additional claim against the estate for $50

form the personal representative for filing fees.
15.

The insurance proceeds of $2,006 and $229 are not part

of the estate.
16.

It is in the best interest of the estate that to the

extent the property is insufficient to pay the claims listed
above, the sums and proceeds in the joint accounts may be applied
for that purpose and credit shall be given for those sums which
have already been paid.
17.

It is in the best interest of the estate that the

attorney's fees and personal representative fees with adjustments
to reflect the change in values be approved and paid.
18.

It would be in the best interest of the estate that

funds paid by Mrs. Beers from her own accounts are to be reimbursed to her from the property of the estate and thereafter from
the joint accounts.
4

A

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The j o i n t

bank

accounts

at Valley

Bank and a t

Davis

C o u n t y Bank i n t h e sum of $ 8 , 0 0 0 and $ 1 0 , 0 0 0 p a s s t o M r s . S h a r o n
B e e r s a s a s u r v i v i n g j o i n t t e n a n t by o p e r a t i o n of l a w and a r e n o t
p r o p e r t y of t h e p r o b a t e
2.

estate.

The W u r l i t z e r

organ

was

gifted

by d e c e d e n t

g r a n d s o n and s a i d o r g a n i s n o t p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e
3.
the

The c l a i m s r e f e r r e d

estate

insufficient

and

to

the

that

t o pay t h o s e c l a i m s ,

the

estate

4.
property

is

payment s h a l l be made from

the

herein.

Credit

to

$3,500

in

property

P r o c e e d s of t h e j o i n t b a n k i n g

Beers are not s u b j e c t

shall

paid.

D e c e d e n t ' s w i d o w , M r s . S u s a n W a g l e y , may c l a i m
up

against

property

j o i n t a c c o u n t s of d e c e d e n t and M r s . S h a r o n B e e r s .
b e g i v e n f o r sums a l r e a d y

his

estate.

t o above a r e v a l i d c l a i m s

extent

to

of

the

estate

as

exempt
defined

a c c o u n t s w i t h Mrs. Sharon

t o t h e $3,500 exempt p r o p e r t y c l a i m of

the

widow.
5.

The i n s u r a n c e p r o c e e d s of $ 2 , 0 0 6 and $229 r e c e i v e d

t h e w i d o w a r e n o t p a r t of t h e p r o b a t e e s t a t e o r s u b j e c t

to

by
the

exempt p r o p e r t y c l a i m of t h e widow.
6.
$372.16

The f e e s of t h e p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
and t h e

attorney's

fees

in the

amount

i n t h e amount of
of

$520.27

a p p r o v e d and s h a l l be p a i d from t h e j o i n t a c c o u n t s t o t h e

are

extent

5

A

that the property of the estate is not sufficient to pay those
f ees«
7.

The Summary of Account and Distribution, the Petition

for Allowance of Claims, Order Allowing Claims and Inventory as
modified above should be approved.
ORDER
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED

that

the

Inventory, Summary of Account and Distribution, Petition for
Allowance of Claims and Order Allowing Claims as modified above
be and the same are hereby approved and the Motion for Order of
Payment from Joint Accounts of Decedent except as set forth above
be and the same is hereby denied.
IT IS HEREBY FURTHER ORDERED that the administration of the
estate be closed and the property be distributed to the parties
as their respective interest may appear.
DATED this

^"d

day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

TO FORM:

f/A''/^
MICHAEL L. DEAMER

1

-k.toMU

DANIEL L. WILSON
6PG29
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75-3-705. Duty of personal representative—Inventory and appraisement.—Within three months after his appointment, a personal representative, who is not a special administrator or a successor to another
representative who has previously discharged this duty, shall prepare
an inventory of property owned by the decedent at the time of his
death, listing it with reasonable detail, and indicating as to each
listed item, its fair market value as of the date of the decedent's
death, and the type and amount of any encumbrance that may exist
with reference to any item. The personal representative shall send a
copy of the inventory to interested persons who request it. He may also
file the original of the inventory with the court.
History: C 1953, 75-3-705, enacted
by L. 1975, ch. 150, § 4; L. 1977, ch. 194,
§34.
Compiler's Notes.
The 1977 amendment deleted "and
file or mail" before "an inventory of
property"; and rewrote the concluding
portion of the section which formerly
read: "to interested persons who request
it, or he may file the original of the
inventory with the court."
The corresponding section In the official text of the Code is numbered 3-706.
Editorial Board Comment
This and the following sections eliminate the practice now required by many
probate statutes under which the judge
is involved in the selection of appraisers.
If the personal representative breaches
his duty concerning the inventory, he
may be removed. Section 75-3-611. Or,
an interested person seeking to surcharge
a personal representative for losses incurred as a result of his administration
might be able to take advantage of any
breach of duty concerning inventory. The
section provides two ways in which a
personal representative may handle an
inventory. If the personal representative
elects to send copies to all interested persons who request it, information con-

cerning the assets of the estate need
not become a part of the records of the
probate court. The alternative procedure
is to file the inventory with the court.
This procedure would be indicated in
estates with large numbers of interested
persons, where the burden of sending
copies to all would be substantial. The
court's role in respect to the second alternative is simply to receive and file
the inventory with the file relating to
the estate. See section 75-3-204, wnich
permits any interested person to demand
notice of any document relating to an
estate which may be filed with the court.
Collateral References.
Executors and AdministratoTs^=J62-73.
33 C.J.S. Executors and Administrators §§ 129-140.
31 Am. Jur. 2d 114, Executors and
Administrators § 209.
Dilatoriness of executor or administrator in filing inventory, or making reports, as ground for removal, 72 A. L. R.
956.
Surchargeability of trustee, executor,
administrator or guardian in respect of
mortgage investment, as affected by matters relating to value of property, 117
A.L.R.B71.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Effect of failure to comply with law.
property belonging to estate.Jn re RobiLetters of administration could be re- son's Estate, 59 if. 431, 204 P. 321.
voked for failure to inventory certain

U.C-A- §75-3-705 and
Editorial Board Comment

A-7

75-6-107. Rights of creditors.—No multiple-party account will be
effective against an estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor
sums needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, including statutory allowances to the surviving spouse, minor children and
dependent children, if other assets of the estate are insufficient. A surviving party, P.O.D. payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from a
multiple-party account after the death of a deceased party shall be liable
to account to his personal representative for amounts the decedent owned
beneficially immediately before his death to the extent necessary to discharge the claims and charges mentioned above remaining unpaid after
application of the decedent's estate. No proceeding to assert this liability
shall be commenced unless the personal representative has received a
written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor, or one acting for a
minor or dependent child of the decedent; and no proceeding shall be
commenced later than two years following the death of the decedent.
Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be administered as
part of the decedent's estate. This section shall not affect the right of a
financial institution to make payment on multiple-party accounts according to the terms thereof or make it liable to the estate of a deceased
party unless before payment the institution has been served with process
in a proceeding by the personal representative.
History. C. 1953, 75-6-107, enacted by
L. 1975, ch. 150, § 7.
_,,...._
, .
Editorial Board Comment.
The sections of this chapter authorize
transfers at death which reduce the
estate to which the surviving spouse,
creditors and minor children normally
must look for protection against a decedent's gifts by will. Accordingly, it
seemed desirable to provide a remedy to
these classes of persons which should
assure them that multiple-party accounts
cannot be used to reduce the essential
protection they would be entitled to if
such accounts were deemed a special
form of specific devise. Under this section a surviving spouse is automatically
assured of some protection against a

multiple-party account if the probate
estate is insolvent; rights are limited,
however, to sums needed for statutory
allowances. The phrase "statutory allowances" includes the homestead allowance under section 75-2-401, the
family allowance under section 75-2-403,
and any allowance needed to make up
the deficiency in exempt property under
section 75-2-402. In any case (including
a solvent estate) the surviving spouse
could proceed under section 75-2-201 et
seq. to claim an elective share in the
account if the deposits by the decedent
satisfy the requirements of section 752-202 so that the account falls within the
augmented net estate concept. In the
latter situation the spouse is not proceeding as a creditor under this section.

U.C.A. §75-6-107 and
Editorial Board Comment

A-8

Section 6-107.

[Rights of Creditors.]

No multiple-party account will be effective against an
estate of a deceased party to transfer to a survivor sums
needed to pay debts, taxes, and expenses of administration, including statutory allowances to the surviving
spouse, minor children and dependent children, if other
assets of the estate are insufficient. A surviving party,
P.O.D. payee, or beneficiary who receives payment from
a multiple-party account after the death of a deceased
party shall be liable to account to his personal representative for amounts the decedent owned beneficially immediately before his death to the extent necessary to
discharge the claims and charges mentioned above remaining unpaid after application of the decedent's estate. No proceeding to assert this liability shall be commenced unless the personal representative has received
a written demand by a surviving spouse, a creditor or
one acting for a minor or dependent child of the decedent, and no proceeding shall be commenced later than
two years following the death of the decedent. Sums recovered by the personal representative shall be admi:r >
tered as part of the decedent's estate. This section shall
not affect the right of a financial institution to ma^e
payment on multiple-party accounts according to the
terms thereof, or make it liable to the estate of a deceased
party unless before payment the institution has been
served with process in a proceeding by the personal representative.
COMMENT
The sections of this Article
authorize transfers at death that
reduce the estate to which the
surviving spouse, creditors, and
minor children normally must
look for protection against a decedent's gifts by will. It seemed
desirable, therefore, to provide a
remedy to these classes of persons
that should assure them that
multiple-party accounts cannot
be used to reduce the essential
protection they would be entitled to if such accounts were
deemed a special form of specific
devise. Under this section, a surviving spouse is automatically assured of some protection against
a multiple-party account if the
probate estate is insolvent; rights
are limited, however, to sums

needed for statutory allowances.
The phrase "statutory allowances" includes the homestead
allowance under Section 2-401,
the family allowance under Section 2-403, and any allowance
needed to make up the deficiency
in exempt property under Section 2-402. In any case (including a solvent estate), the surviving spouse could proceed under
Section 2-201 et seq. to claim an
elective share in the account if
the deposits by the decedent satisfy the requirements of Section
2-202, so that the account falls
within the augmented net estate
concept. In the latter situation,
the spouse is not proceeding as
a creditor under this section.

Model Uniform Probate Code
§6-107 & Official Comment

75-3-806. Allowance of claims.—
(4) Unless otherwise provided in any judgment in another court
entered against the personal representative, allowed claims bear interest
at the legal rate for the period commencing 60 days after the time for
original presentation of the claim has expired unless based on a contract making a provision for interest, in which case they bear interest
in accordance with that provision.

U.C-A.

§75-3-806(4)

4. Interest on Allowed Claims
Allowed claims accrue interest at the legal rate beginning 60 days
after the time for original presentation of the claim. Presumably, the
legal rate is that provided by statute. When the allowed claim is based
on a contract that provides for interest, the allowed claim accrues interest as stated in the contract. Allowed claims resulting from a judgment
in another court accrue interest at the rate stated in the judgment.
(Section 3-806(d))

Official Comment to
Model Uniform Probate Code
§3-806(d)

A-10

